Introduction
My previous report on incomes in retirement (Hutton ) was written in June . Almost a year later, the UK election in May  led to a change in government and, in the following November, to a review of pension provision. The results of this review will be announced in a Green Paper due in the Autumn . Prior to the election the political parties made statements and election pledges on pensions, so that it has been a time of some clarity of position but also, until the results of the review are published, of considerable uncertainty. The areas for debate, however, have been well set out.
Two years ago I concluded :
It will be interesting … to see what progress or otherwise has occurred in ensuring an adequate income in retirement, more equal provision for men and women, in the movement towards funded pensions, in the role of the state pension, and in the progress of the minimum pension guarantee. (Hutton  : ) In this report I will first discuss where the debate on these issues has gone. Policy developments will then be set out, and finally I will identify questions to be asked in evaluating the pensions' review when it is published.
Ensuring an adequate income in retirement
The provisions of the basic UK state pension still mean that anyone who retires with no more than the basic state pension needs to apply for the means-tested income support in order to achieve the level of income the state regards as a minimum. A substantial number of people are likely to have a less than adequate income, both from the evidence of people living on incomes lower than income support through lack of take-up, and from evidence from household budget work that only  per cent of pensioners had more than the £ per week estimated as necessary to provide an adequate standard of living (Oldfield et al. ) . Using expenditure data from the Family Expenditure Survey, Midwinter () derives a figure for a ' wage of retirement ' which should provide the ' dignity and independence ' that politicians say they require for retired people. He argues that many old people cannot live normal lives, including having a day out or taking a newspaper. To derive an amount which would allow them to do so, he compares the expenditure of elderly households dependent on state benefits with that of other comparable better-off households. For single retired persons living alone and reliant on state benefits, more than half of their expenses go on housing, fuel and food. So, as Midwinter claims, they can keep ' body, but not soul together '. Single households not reliant on state benefits, and non-retired households are able to spend considerably more on transport, for example. Examining expenditure on individual items of consumption, Midwinter comes to a figure of £ per week as the amount required to allow elderly households to have a similar life to others in society. At present only  per cent of single pensioners have a gross income of £ per week or more (and  per cent of pensioner couples a gross income twice that), a similar proportion to that estimated by Oldfield et al. () . In more recent work, the Family Budget Unit has derived rather similar levels for their ' modest-but-adequate ' budgets in  prices for single women aged  : £ per week in local authority accommodation, and £ per week in owner-occupied accommodation (Oldfield and Thirlway ) . For couples where the man is aged  and the woman aged , their estimated budgets are £ per week in local authority tenure, and £ for owner-occupiers. The aim of a modest-but-adequate budget is to provide a standard of living which meets basic needs and allows participation in community activities. The budgets are specified by experts for hypothetical families.
In addition to covering the costs of taking an active part in society for as long as possible, the other main requirement for income is that it should be sufficient to pay for care if, and when, it becomes necessary. A recent survey has shown that among the growing numbers of older home owners, awareness of the possibilities of equity release to provide income to pay for care is high, but usage of such schemes is low (Leather ).
In -, the average disposable income was £. per week for single retired people, and for couples £. per week. Single adult households under pension age had disposable incomes of £n per week, and non-retired two-adult households, £n (Office for National Statistics ). The state pension for a single person was £n per week and for a couple £n per week : from April  the corresponding figures were £n and £n. The most recent Household Below Average Incomes publication (Department of Social Security a) still shows that, overall, pensioners have experienced higher rises in incomes (- per cent) than those in work (around  per cent). The basic state pension continues to be up-rated in line with prices. It will become an increasingly small proportion of average earnings, and it certainly will not be through the basic state pension that elderly people will share in the prosperity of the country -one of the aims of both the old and the new governments.
Inequality in the incomes of pensioners continues to grow, according to the most recent Pensioner Income Series (Department of Social Security b). The incomes of the top  per cent of pensioners has increased by  per cent since , whereas the incomes of those in the lowest  per cent of the pensioner income distribution have only risen by  per cent. Some pensioners are sharing in the increasing prosperity but others are left behind. Younger pensioners are more likely to keep up than older pensioners. For example, couples over the age of  receive  per cent (£. per week) less gross income than those under . The recent report on the second wave of the retirement survey also observes that there are those who retire into a healthy and wealthy old age and others who are retired involuntarily or have to remain in work for lack of resources. People with good pensions also tend to have greater assets of other kinds, to retire when they want to (generally earlier) and to live longer than others (Disney et al. ) .
Evans and Falkingham () have used hypothetical individual life histories to assess the impact of low pay and intermittent work on pension entitlement. They compare the pension schemes of the UK, Italy, Sweden, Poland, Chile (the World Bank's exemplar for developing countries) and Australia and assess their ability to provide a minimum income in old age. The UK pension system results in the lowest minimum pension, n per cent of average earnings, compared with n per cent in Chile, and n per cent in Sweden. The UK minimum pension is lower than the level of social assistance which is n per cent of average earnings. Social assistance in other countries is closer to this level except in Italy where it is n per cent of average earnings and in Chile at n per cent. The authors conclude with the observation that there are no ' pure ' pension schemes -entirely funded, entirely pay-as-you-go, with credits, and so on. Most are a combination of a variety of devices but, with the increasing dispersion in labour market opportunities, there is likely to be a continued need to evaluate the effectiveness of systems in providing a minimum income.
More equal provision for men and women
Single women still receive £n less than single men although this varies with age, according to the most recent figures in the Pensioners Incomes Series (Department of Social Security b). So, there is still a concern that women are less well provided for in old age than men. Women are disadvantaged by the fall in the basic pension and SERPS, and by the moves to individually funded pensions which are likely to be gender based. They have lower access than men to occupational pensions (Field and Prior ) .
A comprehensive analysis of pension schemes in Europe, undertaken in the context of EC equality law, highlights various aspects of pension provision which disadvantage women and sets out a preferred solution (Luckhaus and Ward ) . European equality law can be considered to have two strands : equal treatment and compensation. The equal treatment approach has no effect on women's (and men's) pension rights if they are in part-time or low-paid work. Among paid workers, where it is applicable, it has tended to mean a levelling down of benefits in order to achieve equality. The compensatory principle (mainly evident in the rules of pension schemes) seeks to reduce disadvantage. There are three main methods. The first method generates rules which focus on sex and marital status ; for example, rules for earlier retirement ages for women were designed to compensate for past years of unpaid work, and the provision of survivors' benefits to men but not to women is linked to the idea that women are dependent on their husbands. The second type of rule compensates for caring activities and includes such provisions as credits and home responsibility payments for periods of care. Both credits, where the state pays contributions for periods out of employment, and home responsibility payments which reduce the number of years for which contributions must be paid, already exist in the current UK state pension scheme. Neither are based on sex or marital status although, at present, they mainly benefit women. The third compensatory method uses rules in which the pension is based entirely on residence and nationality rather than participation in paid employment. The authors suggest that compensation based on the caring role is optimal, because it can apply to both men and women and it emphasises the importance of caring. The argument against focusing on the caring role is that compensation is only partial, and does not compensate for low-paid, part-time and intermittent work, which in the EU is often linked with caring and largely experienced by women. A final interesting warning from Luckhaus and Ward is that single-member funded pension schemes are outside the scope of EU equality legislation. The move throughout the EU away from statesponsored, pay-as-you-go schemes may mean a more discriminatory future environment for women in the EU. The UK government's proposals for the Stakeholder Pension would seem to fall into this category.
A report by Help the Aged () concludes that pension policy must ensure that women are treated fairly, irrespective of their circumstances. This conclusion is based on a survey of women and their employment history and pension arrangements. In addition the survey highlights women's confusion about pension provision because of their interrupted employment history and because the current system assumes their reliance on men for retirement income. A survey carried out by the Office of Fair Trading () also reveals that women find pension information confusing and that pensions are not designed for ' people like them '. Age Concern identifies the provision of better information as one of their main policy aims for pensions and an important way to improve women's pension position (Age Concern ).
One step towards better pensions for women may be provided in government plans for a bill on pension splitting at the time of divorce, to come into force in the year . Currently, pension rights can be off-set against other assets, or the dependant's part of the pension can be paid when the pension scheme member retires (Department of Social Security c).
Movement towards a funded pension
Since the Progress Report in , the debate about funded versus payas-you-go pension schemes has been taken further in the international context. The author of the World Bank () report on pension provision has recently responded to criticisms from the International Labour Office and the International Social Security Association (James ). The fundamental proposal of the World Bank was for a privately-operated, defined-contribution, funded, second-tier pension.
The report found a variety of problems with the publicly managed payas-you-go, defined-benefit schemes which today are the dominant pension arrangements in many countries, both rich and poor. These problems included high and rising payroll taxes, evasion, early retirement, mis-allocation of public resources, lost opportunities to increase long-term savings, failure to redistribute to low income groups, unintended inter-generational transfers (often to high income groups), growth of a large public pension debt and fiscal unsustainability. The report also claimed that such schemes do not always protect the old, and in particular are not likely to protect future pensioners, have not helped economic growth and are questionable on grounds of equity. On the basis of an international survey of schemes the report concluded that, although not present in all countries, these problems were sufficiently prevalent to be attributable to the schemes rather than the circumstances in individual countries. The report therefore recommended a ' multi-pillar ' system consisting of three schemes, two mandatory and one voluntary. The first would be a publicly-managed, tax-financed, safety-net scheme ; the second a fully-funded and privately managed scheme to cover savings ; and the third would be used by all who wished to provide for higher incomes in old age. The World Bank Report recommended that the funds should be privately managed to ' maximize the economic rather than the political objectives '. This was considered especially important given the large sums of money accumulated in a mandatory pension fund. The limited data available on publicly versus privately managed funds shows that the former earned less than the latter. The report also argued that privately-managed funds are more likely to benefit from investment diversity thus reducing risks, and that funded schemes aid financial market development and lead to greater economic growth. In defending the second-tier pension scheme proposal, James () emphasises that funding is important because it makes affordable the costs of providing for (usually larger) future generations of older people. Fully-funded pension schemes reduce the need for future tax increases to pay for pension promises. They can also be used to build long-term national savings. Because of the automatic inter-generational transfers of pay-as-you-go schemes, such schemes can benefit the rich in previous generations at the expense of the poor in the current generation.
Beattie and McGillivray () agree with much of the analysis in the World Bank report, such as the importance of raising the retirement age and having a strong government role, but their solution is to adapt the old system rather than adopt a fundamental change. James (), however, suggests that they lack concern about the impact on a country's economy of its social security systems, about the inequities noted in the World Bank Report, about the reduced labour market participation and about the avoidance behaviour of citizens. All these concerns, she claims, make the old system non-viable.
In a further rejoinder, Beattie and McGillivray () state that they are still concerned that socially adequate retirement pensions may be sacrificed in the pursuit of economic growth. A further main contention is the risk attached to a defined-contribution versus a defined-benefit scheme. They maintain that a defined-benefit scheme means that a worker's pension is based on earnings at the time of retirement, whereas the funded defined-contribution scheme depends on whatever the sum accumulated will purchase at retirement. The investment risk of each individual pension fund is borne by each pensioner individually. In addition, they point out the fundamental similarity between funded and pay-as-you-go schemes in that both transfer funds from active workers to inactive retired people. Large numbers of retired people mean that defined benefits are likely to be adjusted downwards so that the working generation can afford them. However, the accumulated funds of defined-contribution schemes are also likely to be less valuable in terms of what they can purchase if there is only a small number of workers producing goods and services. Singh () also casts doubts on the benefits of pension funds in the development of capital markets and encouraging economic growth.
In his discussion of the concerns relating to the ageing of the population, Disney () concludes that it is not the ageing of the population that is causing expenditure problems, but the maturing of generous pay-as-you-go systems started - years ago in countries such as Germany, France and Italy which are reaching crisis point. The UK has, he feels, moved successfully to a mixed funded and payas-you-go system and avoided the worst consequences.
The debate about funded versus pay-as-you-go pensions continues both at the national and international level (Asher  ; Melliss ). Melliss claims that the central case in his simulation favours funded pensions yielding a small potential increase in welfare, but other options favour pay-as-you-go pensions. There has also been considerable further discussion of the role of pension funds in capital markets (Blake a and b).
The state pension is still the only source of income for one in seven of pensioners in the UK, and one in three pensioners do not have occupational pensions, according to the recent Pensioners Income Series (Department of Social Security b). Both the Conservative and Labour parties in their  election campaigns emphasised the importance of the basic state pension, and said it would be ' guaranteed ' in the case of the Conservatives, and ' retained ' in the case of Labour. Beyond these broad promises little detailed information is available about the future value of the basic state pension. On th August , The Guardian revealed that Ministers were considering the possibilities of re-establishing the link between pensions and earnings which had been abolished in the s. If the link had not been broken, pensions in  for a single person would have been £n rather than £n. To raise pensions by  per cent rather than the n per cent needed to cover price inflation was estimated to cost £ million. Options for raising this money included : removing the pensioners' £ Christmas bonus yielding £ million, axing the p per week going to pensioners over the age of  yielding £ million, or raising the upper earnings limit on National Insurance to £, per year yielding £ billion. Removing the upper earnings limit altogether would yield £ billion. Each of these options has opponents. Jack Jones of the National Pensioners' Forum has said the first two would be very unpopular and he would lead the opposition to them. Increasing National Insurance contributions, although not strictly speaking an increase in taxation, would in effect damage the middle-class supporters whom the new government is keen to encourage. In her response (The Guardian, th August ) Barbara Castle welcomed the interest in returning the link between the state pension and earnings, but warned against replacing SERPS with individually-funded private pensions schemes. In the section below on the policy debate we will set her reservations against the proposals for the new Stakeholder Pension.
In a discussion of the effectiveness of universal versus selective benefits in income support to older people, Shaver () suggests that the UK combination of the state pension and income support means that almost all elderly people in the UK receive some state support. She uses the latest round of the Luxembourg Income Survey to compare the systems in European countries, Australia and the USA. This reveals that the overall universal state support for elderly people is rather equally distributed, but means-tested benefits, where they are a relatively large part of gross income, are directed towards low-income households and they are the most effective means of redistribution. However, she also notes that selectivity is likely to mean that ' benefits earmarked for the poor are likely to be poor benefits '.
Progress of the minimum pension guarantee
Specific proposals for a minimum pension guarantee do not feature as prominently in the debate as they did two years ago (an exception are the pre-election proposals of the Conservatives for Basic Pension Plus). Ginn (), commenting on the Anson Report (), claims that the Assured Pension recommended in the report differs little from the minimum pension guarantee system of the Commission on Social Justice (). She observes that the combination of low lifetime earnings leading to a small pension to be topped-up by a means-tested element is not very different from the current arrangements for those who retire with a state pension plus income support. Any additions to the pension make no difference to the final income because they simply reduce the means-tested element. It would also have the other disadvantages of means-testing, of lack of take-up and joint assessment of couples. The Assured Pension, by the creation of individual pension funds, would allow the state pension to decline even further.
Policy developments
In June  Peter Lilley, the then Minister for Social Security, announced that Britain's pension system was the best in Europe. This was because British pension funds amounted to nearly £ billion which meant that Britain had more invested than all the rest of Europe put together. Government policies had put Britain in a very good position to deal with the ' demographic time bomb ' and to pay off the national debt. It should be noted that pensions in Britain, and government expenditure on pensions, are lower than in most other European countries (Hutton et al. ) .
Just before the election and as part of the Conservative Party's election campaign, Peter Lilley made a striking election promise ' to guarantee the basic state pension ; to enable future pensioners to share in economic growth ; to give a massive boost to investment and ultimately relieve taxpayers of their biggest burden '. This was to be achieved through the ' Basic Pension Plus ' an arrangement whereby everyone will have their own pension fund and receive a rebate of £ per week to fund their basic pension. So the scheme would include a basic pension, plus a rebate, plus a guarantee. All employees would be contracted out of SERPS (Lilley ) .
The Labour Party election manifesto said that Labour would retain both the basic pension and SERPS.
After the election, the initial focus was on redress of the mis-selling of personal pensions to people who were already contributing to an employer's scheme, although a statement from John Denham, Pensions Minister, also noted that pension provision needed to reflect ' the reality of people's lives ' (Department of Social Security d). People do not stay in the same job from age -, and are sometimes out of employment. Pension policy needs to address the difficulties faced by low income workers, intermittent employment patterns and caring responsibilities.
In determining government policy on pensions, the aim would be to provide pensions which gave value for money, flexibility and security. Pensioners should share fairly in the increasing prosperity of the nation.
The present debate focused on the pensions review which was announced on  July , the aim of which was to address ' nine fundamental challenges ' : $ Sustainable consensus. $ Ensuring a good balance between public and private sector responsibility. $ Responding to demographic change. $ The chance to build up better pensions in their own right in response to social and labour market change, to provide for everyone, men and women, full-and part-time workers, self-employed, those in permanent jobs, and those on short-term contracts. $ Ensuring the resources devoted to pensions are used to maximum effect. $ Regulating pension schemes. $ Raising awareness of pension provision so that people make the right choices. $ Narrowing the pensions gap between men and women. $ Creating the right balance between generations -to-day's versus future pensioners.
At the same time as announcing the Pensions Review, Harriet Harman said the government would build on good quality second pensions. Security in retirement could best be achieved by people building up their own funded second pension. The new proposal for a Stakeholder Pension would meet the government's aims of a secure, flexible and value-for-money second pension for those who cannot join an employer's occupational pension scheme, whose pay is low or intermittent and for whom personal pensions are usually unsuitable.
The Review would also consider the development of a Citizenship Pension for carers who are unable to contribute in their own right to the currently existing pension schemes. The Stakeholder Pension consultation document (Department of Social Security e) gives more detail about how it relates to current provision, where it fits in the wider pensions review, and more precisely who it is designed to help. It is aimed at people who are not eligible for an occupational pension, or for whom a personal pension fund would be too expensive. These are people who would currently belong to SERPS. The problem with SERPS, it is claimed, is that it is a pay-asyou-go scheme and an unfair burden on future generations. One of the aims of the proposed Stakeholder Pensions is to share the costs fairly across the generations. Personal pensions are for those with good earnings who cannot join an occupational pension scheme. The charges within personal pension arrangements can absorb  per cent of the final investment, and if only ten years' contributions are made, the accumulated fund would be reduced by one-third because of charges. Three-quarters of the first two year's contributions go to charges. These high, up-front charges for personal pensions are due to the marketing and sales costs and to the individual advice offered, which makes them much more expensive to run that occupational pension schemes. Another disadvantage is the insecurity of the individual member's final benefit and pension.
Any new pension scheme which is intended to fill the gap in SERPS and personal pension schemes for : people on low earnings, part-time workers, younger people, those on fixed-term contracts, those who change employers, or are self-employed, must include a number of attributes. These include : economies of scale through pooled savings ; easy contribution arrangements, particularly at the workplace ; new partnerships between financial services and retailers, employers, employees and trades unions ; members and employers should contribute to the decisions ; they should be properly regulated, and allow people to opt out of SERPS.
Many of the people to whom the Stakeholder Pension is directed are likely to be working for smaller employers or periodically changing jobs, so that multi-member schemes will be needed to provide for people who have worked for a number of employers. Employers would be encouraged but not obliged to be involved with Stakeholder Pensions. Schemes might be set up by members of a trade union or an employers' federation with partners from the financial services sector. Such arrangements are thought to provide the best means of securing members' interests. Other options are industry schemes and schemes designed for self-employed people, or schemes accessed through retail outlets, for example. It is likely to be schemes rather than individual providers which will be subject to regulation. Promotion of schemes is likely to be expensive and the government has not yet decided whether to make such second-tier pension contributions compulsory or not. Some schemes should be flexible and transferable so that people will be able to remain in the scheme if they change jobs or will be able to move easily to a new scheme with full recognition of previous contributions. Early in , the Treasury announced further measures to make pension provision more flexible, to allow people with a personal pension who wish to join an occupational scheme to transfer their funds to a free-standing additional voluntary contributions scheme. Employers are also being encouraged to set up group personal pensions, and those with additional voluntary contributions are to be enabled to draw their pensions any time between the ages of  and  (HM Treasury ).
The Pension Provision Group, an independent group including academics, pensions administrators, employers and trades unionists, and appointed in the summer of  as part of the Government's Pensions Review, has recently published its report (Pension Provision Group ). It concludes that : the state's role is necessary and affordable ; the state earnings related pension scheme (SERPS) is currently better than many people think, but will decline in value ; personal pensions provide some opportunities ; compulsion is not new ; and pensions have had, and always will have, an element of risk for the individual.
Questions to be asked of new pension arrangements after the results of the review are announced
In setting out their policy for an adequate income in retirement, Age Concern () pose some questions to be answered by the Government review of pensions. They ask how close the proposals will come to the ideal pension provision from an individual's point of view. This is that it should be : adequate ; available to all sections of the population, including those with interrupted working lives ; low risk ; flexible in terms of changing jobs or work patterns ; provide a good return on contributions ; and affordable from current income. Other questions arising from recent literature are highlighted below.
How secure will individual private pension funds be ? The investment market has generally been rising in recent years and this may have led to an over-optimistic view of how the investment market will generate income at some uncertain time in the future. Funded pensions are just as vulnerable as pay-as-you-go schemes to the economic effects of an ageing population and early exit from the labour market (Hutton ) .
Is private pension insurance for higher risk cases simply providing a route for state funds to go into private pockets ? Barbara Castle claims that the state pension is not ' state-financed ' but an insurance scheme like any other, and that the Treasury has only made modest contributions to it. Far greater state contributions have been made to the private sector through tax concessions and financial inducements to encourage people to join the new personal pension schemes. Tax relief on private pensions amounts to between a quarter and a third of the direct support of state pensions through public expenditure and is regressive, not transparent, and there are problems of control. Le Grand and Agulnik () propose a matching grant scheme in which the government would use the money released from the tax relief system to match all the contributions that individuals make to a private pension. It would extend help to those below the tax threshold, and would be clear and adjustable. The grant could be at an appropriate rate (for example from p up to pound-for-pound) and up to a maximum amount of contributions. It would thus be revenue-neutral.
The Government's proposed scheme can only help the low paid, the sick and the unemployed to build up a pension fund by credits and payments from general taxation -a further movement from state funds to the pockets of private pension funds. Ginn () also asks who, apart from the City, benefits from a funded scheme. Downs () notes that the current state pension scheme has been modelled on a private insurance scheme and he questions, given the proliferation and choice of private schemes, whether this is now relevant.
Will the problem of high levels of up-front charges be avoided ? The administrative charges for the current UK pension schemes (including the contracting-out option for SERPS) are estimated to be around five per cent compared with at least  per cent for personal pensions. Given this, and the spread of risk in a collective rather than individual scheme, Salter () argues for a mixed economy of pensions, and proposes that the state should provide a universal, basic, adequate pension, supplemented by collective schemes and occupational schemes.
Is pay-as-you-go such a bad thing ? Is it true that the present working age population would not or could not support the older generation ? Payas-you-go schemes such as SERPS and the state pension scheme could be the most efficient and secure way to provide an income in old age for many people. According to Barbara Castle (The Guardian,  August ), the risk of the state raiding schemes to cover state spending can be overcome by joint trade union and pensioner lobbying activity as has been shown in Italy and France. Salter () also suggests that both pay-as-you-go and fully-funded schemes impose a cost on future generations. The latter point is also made by Downs (). He argues that, as a result of higher earnings, savings (for example, investment in occupational pension schemes) for a longer and healthier retirement seem more attractive relative to non-essential current consumption. He maintains that the link between funded pension schemes, investment and growth is not clear, but the pay-roll tax aspect of the state National Insurance contributions, and the compulsory contributions to private pension schemes proposed by Field (), would both have an impact on the labour market. In reforming pensions, redistributional aspects are important to maintain standards of living in old age, and the state has the democratic authority to accomplish this.
How will any proposed scheme fit with arrangements in other European countries in the light of the moves to monetary union ? The Government's proposals for pensions largely follow the World Bank pension model, and also fall within the debate which is taking place throughout many European countries. Reynaud (), in a clear summary of the issues for European countries, concludes that ' a new balance among the various components of the national pension scheme will be sought by adapting current systems and redefining the roles of the various players involved, the individual, employers, trades unions, financial services '.
Will pensions be up-rated in line with incomes or prices ? In a recent article, Vording and Goudswaard () studied the legal requirements for pensions indexation and the actual outcomes in a number of European countries, and concluded that a legal stipulation about pensions indexation is well-supported, but that governments find ways of adjusting the actual level of indexation to respond to economic and social circumstances.
Conclusion
Since I prepared the previous Progress Report two years ago, the pension debate has been high on the UK policy agenda. Since the Government reshuffle of July , however, we have to wait longer for the results of the Pensions Review to be announced and the Green Paper published. This report has highlighted the main points of the debate and set out the questions to be asked of the proposals put forward in the Green Paper.
